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1. Bertrand Russell was one of the most important founders 
of mathematical logic and he has contributed to the formula-
tion of a modern semiotics over and above his logical stud-
ies in a series of different, generally well-known philo-
sophical essays. Therefore if we want to summarize his spe-
cial conception we must mention repeatedly some ideas and 
concepts introduced by him which appear today to be basic in 
semiotic research. Notwithstanding the fact that some of 
Russell's writings have absolute authority we cannot here 
speak of any unanimous and adequate interpretation of his 
philosophical studies; in spite of the rational and lin-
guistic clarity in the formulation of his ideas the litera-
ture on Russell is full of misunderstandings and misinterpre-
tations (cf. Russell (1944)). A reason for these errors can 
be found in the changing of his philosophical ideas which 
could hardly be considered as true representatives of a 
nominalistic system: he started out as a monistic philoso-
pher, and even his first logistic work is characterized by 
a Platonic ontology, although he abandoned this position in 
his later studies he felt a sort of nostalgia for this 
view. We do not intend to give an account of Rus&éil's 
monist papers, even his later Platonic conception will only 
be mentioned and analysed briefly in order to make under-
standable the sense of the later changes. We shall have to 
summarize Russell's classical theory of denotation with all 
the new results it brought in ontological, epistemological 
and semantical contexts. Our main aim is, however, to give a 
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systematic analysis of Russell's views on fictionality. This 
investigation should be carried out not only because Russell 
was deeply interested in fictional texts and had an e-
normously wide literary and cultural education, he formulat-
ed from time to time some items of fiction, the number of 
which should not be limited to the published volumes Russell 
(1953), (19541 and (.1961), but should include many unpub-
lished stories, among others even a n o v e l o u r study is 
moved by the importance of Russell's remarks which seem to 
bear a paradigmatic character. We find Russell's semantic 
ideas concerning fictionality with all the dilemmas and open 
questions very characteristic of the nominalistic point of 
view even if in the case of a dogmatic standpoint they were 
not formulated at all or were worded in such a way that the 
difficulties disappeared. Russell's different attempt at the 
definition of fictionality give an insight into the problems 
of 'interpretation the nominalistically based theory is con-
fronted with, and point consequently to its advantages and 
to its risks. 
1.1. Before dealing with Russell's ideas concerning fic;-
tionality we must have a comprehensive view of his conception 
determining his semantic decisions. His first contribution 
to modern logic and semiotics was formulated in Russell 
(1903), in a characteristic work of the transition announc-
ing the new orientation in logic and mathematics and present-
ing a denotation theory based on Platonic ontology. We are 
mainly interested in his new ideas as far as they remained 
decisive in his later development. The Preface to the first 
edition of this volume speaks of two main objects: the re-
ducibility of all pure mathematics to a very small number of 
fundamental concepts and the philosophical explanation of 
these fundamental concepts which mathematics accepts as in-
definable (XV.). From our point of view the latter problem 
is obviously of main importance. 
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2.1.1. Russell's book opens with a definition of pure math-
ematics: "PURE Mathematics is the class of all propositions 
of the form 'p implies q', where p and q are propositions 
containing one or more variables, the same in the two pro-
positions, and neither p nor q contain any constants except 
logical constants." (3.) It follows an explication of the 
term "logical constant" by means of the enumeration of sev-
4 
eral examples, however, the central concept, the proposi-
tion, cannot in this way be elucidated, a full explanation 
is delivered during the theoretical explanation of logical 
concepts. Proposition is primarily introduced as a member 
of a logical metalanguage, and appears in opposition to log-
ical variable, logical constant, propositional function, 
etc. A logical variable is a very complicated concept, "... 
a variable is any term Qua term in a certain propositional 
function ... variables are distinguished by the proposi-
tional functions in which they occur, or, in the case of 
several variables, by the place they occupy in a given mul-
tiple variable propositional function." (107.) We can dis-
tinguish apparent and real variables, the former appear in 
propositions, "the variable is absorbed ... the proposition 
does not depend upon the variable; whereas in 'x is a man' 
there are different propositions for different values of the 
variable, and the variable is ... real". (13) The notion of 
a propositional function is explained, but not defined in 
the following way: "(fx is a propositional function if, for 
every value of i, is a proposition, determinate when x is 
given". (.19) A proposition can be conceived of syntactically 
in contradistinction to propositional function: "I shall 
speak of propositions exclusively where there is no real 
variable: where there are one or more real variables, and 
for all values of the variables the expression involved is a 
proposition, I shall call the expression a propositional func-
tion" . (13) The proposition has over and above this charac-
teristic and essential device: 
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"A proposition, we may say, is anything that is true or 
that is false." (12-13.) viz. it disposes of truth-value. 
Russell formulates a definition of proposition by means of a 
tautology 
/1/ p 3 p 
which holds only for propositions.5 The logical analysis of 
proposition by means of the explanation of its further con-
stituents such as material and formal implication, class, 
etc. is carried out in the way signalized by the quoted de-
finitions which demonstrate Russell's discoveries during his 
first generalization of modern logic and mathematics, and at 
the same time the superficiality of some of his theses. As 
the last ones have been corrected in Principia Mathematica 
and we do not want to evince the changes which Russell's 
system underwent during that time we want to disregard an 
extensive analysis of his logical metalanguage and we want 
to see briefly how the concept of proposition is embedded 
in grammatical and semantical contexts. 
1.1.2. Russell considers grammar already in this work "as 
a source of discovery" (.42) even if correctness in the use 
of language must be checked philosophically because the 
general requirements are not ideally fulfilled in natural 
language and in its practical use. Therefore he tries to 
explain the linguistic structure from a philosophic and may 
we say a general semiotic point of view. At the centre of 
his investigation again stands the proposition, however, 
the main difference between the linguistic unit "sentece" 
and "proposition" is not clearly explicated. In his discus-
sion with Bradley, Russell tries to point out the distinc-
tion between proposition and the linguistic unit sentence,6 
however, he cannot elucidate the mutual dependence of the 
two concepts on each other. In his later studies Russell 
(1919b) (1940) Russell points to propositions as invariant 
structure classes underlying declarative sentences formulât-
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ed in different languages which have the same meaning, al-
though in the linguistic formulation there exist some retho-
ric differences besides the choice of the language; in this 
way it represents one of the most abstract semiotlc struc-
tures of a linguistic utterance. As syntactic structures 
Russell mentions two different sequences: 
/2/ a. Subject - verb - predicate 
b. Subject - verb - object^ ... objectn 
/2/ a. can be considered as the classical Aristotelian 
way of analysis, Russell's contention that relational pre-
dicates, i. e. verbs, cannot be reduced to the ancient Sub-
ject - copula - predicate formula opens the way to the new 
mathematical logical analysis of language. However at this 
stage it is full of difficulties, one of the main problems 
consists in the fact that syntactical facts, e. g. the ex-
istence of various possibilities for the fulfillment of a 
syntactic function like subject, make a semantic interpreta-
tion of these constituents very complicated, even unaccep-
table. This problem will be solved in Principia Mathematica 
by means of the introduction of the Theory of Types. At this 
point the Platonic ontology of this theory clearly manifests 
itself: the semantic category corresponding to the syntactic 
category subject is "term": "Whatever may be an object of 
thought, or may occur in any true or false proposition, or 
can be counted as one, I call a term. ... I shall use as 
synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. 
The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one, 
while the third is derived from the fact that every term has 
being, i. e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a 
class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be 
mentioned, is sure to be a term: and to deny that such and 
such a thing is a term must always be false.: (43) This is a 
characteristically Meinongian point of view which has a 
direct influence on a theory concerning fictionality: it is 
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quite clear that "the pseudo-exlstents of a novel" (45) 
partake in this generally assumed existence of the objects. 
Terms are distinguished as things - the counterparts of 
proper names - and concepts which are indicated by all other 
words. "Among concepts ... two kinds at least must be dis-
tinguished, namely those indicated by adjectives and those 
indicated by verbs." (44) The first class is defined as 
7 8 
predicate the second is that of relations. This grammati-
cal conception has without doubt contributed to a new inter-
pretation of the grammatical constituents, however, it does 
not offer a comprehensive overview of the linguistic system 
and the principles taken into account stand in contradiction 
to each other. 
1.1.3. This contradictory relationship applies first of all 
to the semantic part of the theory. On the one hand Russell 
wants to formulate a correspondence theory based on empiri-
cal confrontation of linguistic utterances and the real 
connexions denoted by them, on the other hand, however, he 
postulates the Platonic or realistic existence of the ob-
jects appearing in texts. "Denoting", "denotation" appear in 
this theory as a second semantic term beside "meaning". 
Meaning is defined as a symbolic relation standing between 
9 
single words and their non-verbal content. The proposition 
is considered as an objective non-linguistic structure, it 
consists of the entities indicated by the words,^ and cor-
responds with the Fregean "Gedanke" concept together with 
its t r u t h - v a l u e . I n this sense "meaning" is irrelevant for 
proposition and for the semantic analysis of this central 
unit. "But such concepts as a man have meaning in another 
sense: they are so to speak, symbolic in their own logical 
nature, because they have the property which I call denot-
ing. That is to say, wher a man occurs in a proposition 
/e. g. 'I met a man in the street'// the proposition is not 
about the concept a man, but about something quite different, 
some actual biped denoted by the concept. Thus concepts of 
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this kind have meaning in a non-psychological sense. And in 
this sense, when we say 'this is a man', we are making a 
proposition in which a concept is in some sense attached to 
what is not a concept." (47) Denotation is clearly introduc-
ed as the determining relation between some definite con-
stituent of the verbal equivalent of the proposition and its 
non-verbal or even verbal referent, a unit formulated in the 
sense of the correspondence theory. "A concept denotes when, 
if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not about 
the concept, but about a term connected in a certain pecul-
iar way with the concept. If I say 'I met a man', the pro-
position is not about a man: this is a concept which does 
not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the 
logic-books. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an ac-
tual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public-house 
and a drunken wife." (53) Denoting can be expressed by pre-
dicates and more generally formulated by class-concepts which 
may appear alone in a simple subject-predicate proposition, 
but they may also have a great variety of closely allied 
concepts, i. e. an apparatus for describing the denotation 
in detail. The examination of denotation is carried out by 
means of the analysis of these operator concepts which com-
bine predicative concepts in a way to form new denotating 
concepts. The examples chosen are "all, every, any, a, some 
and the." (55) Russell's main contribution to denotion in 
this early work consists in the analysis of the first five 
mentioned operators by means of propositional logic and the 
calculus of classes, the definite description the had to be 
separated, because the author had here to be content with 
some general philosophical remarks concerning the main topic 
of his later theory of descriptions. 
At the beginning of this analysis Russell raises the 
question: "is there one way of denoting six different kinds 
of objects, or are the ways of denoting different? And in 
the latter case, is the object denoted the same in all six 
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cases, or does the object differ as well as the way of de-
noting it?" (53) The dilemma spelled out in the first ques-
tion is the classical problem of reference in medieval lo-
gic, i. e. which system should be chosen, the doctrine of 
distribution or the modes of reference. In the doctrine of 
distribution the difference of the reference is postulated, 
however, this solution leads to logical inconsistencies 
(cf. Geach (1962) 3-46), therefore we accept Geach's con-
clusion: 'if a theory of common nouns' being logical sub-
jects is to be taken seriously, it must make any (unambiguous) 
common noun refer in an impartial way to each of the objects 
that could be so named in a simple act of naming." (Geach 
(1962) 46). Russell's conception corresponds to the second 
theory, but it must be emphasized that this view is histori-
cally independent of the medieval approaches, but it agrees 
with them in pointing out "that denoting itself is the same 
in all cases" (Russell (1903) 62) and permits or does not 
exclude the conception of distinctness in the objects denot-
ed by all men, every men, etc. as various species of refer-
ence. (61). The definition of different denoting phrases is 
given by means of logical operations: "All a's ... denotes a 
numerical conjunction; it is definite as soon as a is given. 
The concept all a's is a perfectly definite single concept, 
which denotes the terms of a taken all together. ... Every a, 
on the contrary, though it still denotes all the a's, de-
notes them in a different way, i. e. severally instead of 
collectively, Any a denotes only one a- but it is wholly 
irrelevant which it denotes, and what is said will be qually 
true whichever it may be. Moreover, any a denotes a variable 
a, that is, whatever particular a we may fasten upon it, it 
is certain that any a does not denote that one; and yet of 
that one any proposition is true which is true of any a. 
An a denotes a variable disjunction: that is to say, a pro-
position which holds of an a may be false concerning each 
particular a, so that it is not reducible to a disjunction 
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of propositions ... some a, the constant disjunction ... 
denotes just one term of the class a, but the term it de-
notes may be any term of the class. ... In the case of a 
class a which has a finite number of terms - say a , a 2, 
a^, ... aR, we can illustrate these various notions as 
follows: 
/1/ All a's denotes a. and a- and ... and a . i. z n 
/2/ Every a denotes a^ and denotes a2 and ... and 
denotes a . n 
/3/ Any a denotes ^ or a 2 ... or an, where or has 
the meaning that it is irrelevant which we take. 
/4/ An a denotes a^ or a^ or ... or a, where or has 
the meaning that no one in particular must be 
taken. 
/5/ Some a denotes a^ or denotes a 2 o r ••• o r denotes 
a n, where it is not irrelevant which is taken, 
but on the contrary some one particular a must 
be taken." (58-59) 
Concerning the definite description the we must be con-
tent with some general remarks: "The word the3 in the singu-
lar, is correctly employed only in relation to a class-con-
cept of which there is only one instance. We speak of the 
King, the Prime Minister, and so on (understanding at the 
present time)} and in such cases there is a method of denot-
ing one single definite term by means of a concept, which is 
not given us by any of our five words. It is owing to his 
notion that mathematics can give definitions of terms which 
are not concepts ... An object may be present to the mind, 
without our knowing any concept of which the said object is 
the instance; and the discovery of such a concept is not a 
mere improvement in notation. The reason why this appears 
to be the case is that, as soon as the definition is found, 
it becomes v/holly unnecessary to the reasoning to remember 
the actual object defined, since only concepts irrelevant 
to our deductions." (62-63) Russell points out that "the 
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actual use of identity, though not its meaning, was also 
found to depend upon this way of denoting a single term." 
(65) 
1.2. We have dealt rather extensively with this Meinongian 
denotation theory because some of the most essential prob-
lems of Russell's later conception are notionally and ter-
minologically prepared in his early views, (cf. Hursthouse 
(1980)) even if some of his critics (e. g. Geach)are in-
clined to see in it an erroneous theory that should be dis-
tinguished from his later writings. We should like to lay 
stress equally upon similarity and dissimilarity, therefore 
we shall compare this starting point with the results of 
Russell's later development in view of ontologlcal and 
epistemological determination, and the syntactic-semantic 
structure of denotation. 
1.2.1. The ontologlcal standpoint in Russell's early work 
is Platonic or realistic, this can be established on the 
basis of his analysis of the semantic constituents of the 
proposition: we remember his postulate that the subject of 
the proposition was a term and this term was conceived as 
being in each case an existing entity. This is a Meinongian 
view and its theoretical background should not be explicat-
ed within the frame of the present study. However, this 
work does not appear an orthodox representative of the 
classical realistic view: with his critic oriented against 
the Aristotelian Subject-copula-predicate formula presented 
as the only logic-linguistic structure of our different 
utterances, Russell proves to be an adversary of the clas-
sical substance-attribute conception which is based on the 
12 
criticized subject-predicate theory. It is highly sig-
nificant thdt in the definition of matter Russell does not 
take the realistic foundation of his theory into account 
but he tries to give an empiricist characterization of this 
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entity. "Material unit is a class-concept, applicable to 
whatever has the following characteristics: /1/ A simple 
material unit occupies a spatial point at any moment; two 
units cannot occupy the same point at the same moment, and 
one cannot occupy two points at the same moment. /2/ Every 
material unit persists through time; its positions in 
space at any two moments may be the same or different; but 
if different, the positions at times intermediate between 
the two chosen must form a continuous series. /3/ Two mate-
rial units differ in the same immediate manner as two points 
or two colours; they agree in having the relation of inclu-
sion in a class to the general concept matter, or rather to 
the general concept material unit. Matter itself seems to 
be a collective name for all pieces of matter, as space for 
all points and time for all instants. It is thus the pe-
culiar relation to space and time which distinguishes matter 
from other qualities, and not any logical difference such as 
that of subject and predicate, or substance and attribute." 
(468). The spatial-temporal determined material units build 
chains of events underlying physical relations like causal-
ity, motion. The non-material particulars are - with the 
exception of some brief remarks on occupation of time with-
out existence (cf. 471) - not extensively dealt within the 
frame of this theory so that we do not have the slightest 
idea the place that chimerae and impossible objects should 
have in the realm of the being conceived by Russell (cf. 
Quine (1966) p. 658). Instead of a Meinongian development 
of this realistic system Russell's main decision in the 
ontological field consisted in giving up those terms which 
were not connected with space and time and of whose exist-
ence we have no empirical verification through perception, 
and in confining himself to the study of events and the 
problems of•knowledge, i. e. how do we obtain reliable in-
formation about the existing particulars. This turniny-point 
in Russell's ontological conception was a rather complicat-
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ed process and if one considers that some constituents of 
this system were worked out on such a scale as e. g. in the 
case of the redefinition of matter which was achieved in 
Russell (1927a) and the theory of knowledge by acquaintance 
and knowledge by description which goes back to 1902, one 
may ask whether we can speak about a coherent system or 
not.13 We can detect an inner logic between the different 
constituents the enumeration of which we begin with the 
earliest theory concerning the different kinds of knowledge 
of particulars. The sensible and understandable use of lan-
guage has, over and above grammatical and semiotical rules, 
some epistemological predispositions concerning our know-
ledge of constituents spelled out in the following general 
principle: "Every proposition which we understand must be 
composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquaint-
ed." (Russell (1910-1911) 209. and similarly Russell (1912) 
91.) This principle makes grammar dependent on our knowledge 
of the external world: we can only speak about objects that 
we know and the meaning of which is familiar to us by means 
of linguistic items. This means not only that proper names 
must denote different individuals, but "our bound variables 
range over known individuals only" and the "quantifiers 
range over objects of acquaintance only" (Hintikka (1981) 
175.) 
Russell admits two kinds of objects that correspond to 
the linguistic constituents: "There are ... at least two 
sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, particulars 
and universals. Among particulars I include all existents, 
and all complexes of which one or more constituents are 
existents, such as this-before-that, this-above-that, the-
-yellowness-of-this. Among universals I include all objects 
of which no particular is a constituent. Thus the disjunc-
tion 'universal-particular' includes all objects." (Russell 
(1910-1911) 204.) The postulation of existing universals, 
which applies to the relation (it is supposed that we are 
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acquainted with the meaning of it and not merely with 
instances of it), is a characteristically non-nominalistical 
feature in Russell's system. 
Russell argues that there are two essential ways in 
which we can obtain knowledge of the non-verbal or verbal 
content of the constituents in our linguistic system: the 
first consists in acquaintance, i. e. a direct presentation 
of the particulars to us (cf. Russell (1910-1911) 201f.) 
the second in a verbal definite description "the so-and-so" 
having the distinctive features of this formula, namely the 
existence of a unique object possessing such and such pre-
dicates (Ibid, 205.) In this way Russell's theory of know-
ledge points to the epistemological frame in which the con-
ception of the perception of objects can be formulated and 
to a new denotation theory based on the principles of Rus-
sell (1905b) and of Principia Mathematica. 
1.2.2. Epistemological questions are introduced by the rela-
tion acquaintance: they can primarily be formulated accord-
ing to which objects may appear as referents of the dyadic 
relation "acquaintance", the relatum being always "we", i.e. 
représentants of a socio-culturally defined human community. 
These objects are, as we know, particulars and universals 
and according to Russell one becomes aware of both of them 
by means of sense-data (Russell (1910-1911) 201, 203.). 
After his early works Russell became a consistent follower 
of British empiricism, he considered that sense-data and 
perception are the only direct information we acquire from 
the world of the objects and therefore they are our means 
of control of our verbal expressions: We have no data at 
our disposal giving insight into the material structure of 
physical appearences except our sense-data, which can be 
considered a's mental events. Russell is of the opinion that 
we may have "some principle a priori without the need of 
empirical verification", however, the main line of défini-
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tion lies in another direction: "We may succeed in actually 
defining the objects of physics as functions of sense-data. 
Just in so far as physics leads to expectations, this must 
be possible, since we can only expcct what can be experi-
enced. And in so far as the physical state of affairs is 
inferred from sense-data it must be capable of expression 
as a function of sense-data." (Russell (1914b)). Russell 
explained this special compresence of physical-material 
structure with perceptive psycho-physiological connexions 
by the concept of his neutral monism redefining the rela-
tionship of mental and material constituents to each other 
in the structure of the world: "... the view which I am 
advocating is neither materialism nor mentalism, but what 
(following the suggestion of Dr. H. M. Sheffer) we cali 
'neutral monism*. It is monism in the sense that it regards 
the world as composed of only one kind of stuff, namely 
events; but it is pluralism in the sense that it admits the 
existence of a great multiplicity of events, each minimal 
event being a logically self-subsistent entity." (Russell 
(19 27b) 293.) "While, on the question of the stuff of the 
world, the theory ... has certain affinities with idealism 
- namely, that mental events are part of that stuff, and 
that the rest of the stuff resembles them more than it 
resembles traditional billiard-balls - the position advo-
cated as regards scientific laws has more affinity with ma-
terialism than with idealism." (Russell (1927a) 388.) Phys-
ics can never be analysed without taking into account the 
psychological component of the perception of the physical 
facts, therefore Russell deals intensively with the contem-
porary development of psycho-physiological sciences. He 
turned in first decade of this century to the behaviorism 
which he found a progressive experimental trend in psycho-
physiology, although he could never agree with its dogmatic 
antimentalism. He formulated his relationship to behaviorism 
in the following way: "This philosophy ... holds that every-
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tiling that can be known about man is discoverable by the 
method of external observation, i. e. that.none of our 
knowledge depends, essentially and necessarily, upon data in 
which the observer and the observed are the same person. I 
do not fundamentally agree with this view, but I think it 
contains much more truth than most people suppose, and I re-
gard it as desirable to develop the behaviorist method to 
the fullest possible extent. I believe that the knowledge to 
be obtained by this method, so long as we take physics for 
granted, is self-contained, and need not, at any point, ap-
peal to data derived from introspection ... Nevertheless, I 
hold that there are such observations and there is knowledge 
which depends upon introspection. What is more, I hold that 
data of this kind are required for a critical exposition of 
physics, which behaviorism takes for granted. I shall, 
therefore, after setting forth the behaviorist view of man, 
proceed to a scrutiny of our knowledge of physics, returning 
thence to man, but now as viewed from within". (Russell 
(1927b) 73-74.) Behaviorism can serve as an auxiliary sci-
ence and we may achieve by means of it a number of interest-
ing results, however, its conclusions must be queried be-
cause of the inadequate foundation of the theory. Russell's 
attack against behaviorism as a final philosophy formulates 
the inconsequences following from its theoretical and metho-
dological one-sidedeness (cf. Russell (1927b) 135, 139.) As 
to the material or physical side of the inquiry Russell gave 
up very slowly the Newtonian concept presented in Russell 
(1903): after the mainly linguistically-logically oriented 
logical atomism he turned again to the structures of the 
external world and after having given an outline in Russell 
(1924) he formulated an intensive analysis of matter in Rus-
sell (1927a) which applied already the results of Einstein's 
theory. This book is conceived on the basis of an elaborated 
variant of neutral monism, therefore the investigation ends 
with a part "in which we endeavour to discover a possible 
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structure of the physical world which shall at once justify 
physics and take account of the connection with perception 
demanded by the necessity for an empirical basis for phys-
ics. Here we are concerned first with the construction of 
points as systems of events which overlap, or are 'conpunc-
tual', in space-time, and then with purely ordinal pro-
perties of space-time. ... The conception of one unit of 
matter - say one electron - as a 'substance', 1. e. a single 
simple entity persisting through time, is not one which we 
are justified in adopting, since we have no evidence what-
ever as to whether it is false or true. We define a single 
material unit as a 'causal line', i. e. as a series of events 
connected with each other by an intrinsic differential causal 
law which determines first-order changes, leaving second-or-
der changes to be determined by extrinsic causal laws." 
(Russell (1927a) 401.) This special view remained Russell's 
conception concerning physical structure in his ensuing de-
cisive works (Russell (1940) and (1948)). Structure itself 
may be defined by several relations. There are abstract, log-
ical and mathematical relationships between the constituents 
of the structure that may be explained by means of a minimum 
vocabulary (cf. Russell (1948) 267-283.). 
1.2.3. These deep changes in the ontological and epistemol-
ogical structure of Russell's theory had direct consequences 
for the formulation of his denotation theory. In the early 
theory presented in Russell (1903) one may mention different 
"slips on Russell's part" (Geach (1962) 77.) such as the in-
correct translation of the formula "any term of an A", the 
unsatisfactory distinction between 'any' and 'every' at a 
certain place (cf. Geach (1962) 76-77.J etc. however the 
main problem with the whole theory consists in the faĉ t that 
it fails to.take into consideration the question of the 
scope and therefore it must be held to be radically incon-
sistent: "With a little ingenuity all the examples that gave 
plausibility to the distinctions between 'any' and 'every'. 
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between 'some and 'a', can be explained by differences of 
punctuation or scope." (Geach (1962) 105.) Russell's turning-
point with respect to denotation is his classical essay Rus-
sell (1905b): here he is compelled to revise the requirement 
to dispose semantic categories, meaning and denotation, each 
of them pertaining to different constituents of the proposi-
tion. The result of this revision is "that the whole dis-
tinction of meaning and denotation has been wrongly con-
cieved." (Russell (1905b) 50.) The central idea of the new 
theory is formulated so "that denoting phrases never have 
any meaning in themselves, but that every proposition in 
whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning." (Russell 
(1905b) 43.) The terminology is new, Russell does not speak 
any more about denoting concepts, the denoting phrases cor-
respond to the combination of concepts by means of the six 
words all, every, any, etc. Besides the denoting phrases 
there is a simple constituent which has directly to do with 
denotation: "a name ... directly designating and individual 
which is its meaning, and having this meaning in its own 
right, independently of the meanings of all other words" 
(Russell (1919a) 174.). Names, i. e. proper names have the 
function of designating particulars and in Russell's dif-
ferent periods the particulars were seen as "terms of rela-
tions in atomic facts" (Russell (1918-1919) 199.) or as 
"assigned to any continuous portion of space-time ... every 
proper name is the name of a structure, not of something 
destitute of parts". (Russell (1940) 31.) Independently of 
the different interpretation of this category there is a 
constant suspicion concerning proper names used in natural 
language: "The names that we commonly use, like 'Socrates', 
are really abbreviations for descriptions; not only that, 
but what they describe are not particulars but complicated 
systems of classes or series. A name, in the narrow logical 
sense of a word whose meaning is a particular, can only be 
applied to a particular with which the speaker is acquaints 
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ed..." (Russell (1918-1919) 200, 201.) This view and in gen-
eral the application of Russell's theory of knowledge to the 
natural language raise different problems cf. Reeves (1933) 
and Black (1944). From the vocabulary only egocentric par-
ticulars such as "this" may fulfil the strict requirements 
in designating an object. In contrast to proper names, de-
noting phrases do not have a constant meaning, it is ques-
tionable whether they have significance at all in the con-
crete proposition. This can be decided by means of a strict-
ly codified translation of the proposition in a logical 
structure determining its constituents and their relation-
ship to each other. The idea of the reduction of denoting 
phrases to symbolic logic made most of the distinctions 
introduced in Russell (1903) outworn concepts: here the 
scope was fully recognized and differences between the lin-
guistic formulations that cannot be captured in a pure logi-
cal system (cf. Lang (1977), Kanyô (1977)) appeared to be of 
secondary importance. The logical analysis could give a 
clear logical-semantical interpretation for denoting phrases 
containing alt, every, no, any, some, the specific problems 
of denotation in this case are connected with the use and 
the semantic sense of variables bound by universal and ex-
istential operators. The remaining types of denoting phrases 
- the first introduced by the, the second by a(n) - repre-
sent highly interesting cases of denotation and are named 
descriptions, 1. e. the first definite, the second indefi-
nite description. It is the definite description that stands 
at the centre of the theory of description. This formula is 
formally defined: "a definite description is a phrase of the 
form ' the so-and-so' (in the singular)". (Russell (1919a) 
167.) This definition is unsatisfactory however, - as e. g. 
Linsky has pointed out in Linsky (1967) 63. the same expres-
sion does not refer to a particular in a general statement. 
In answer to similar criticisms in Moore (1944) 214f Russell 
deplored his "own carelessness in the use of ordinary lan-
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guage. As to this, however, I should say that the whole of 
my theory of descriptions is contained in the definitions at 
the beginning of *14 of Prinaipia Mathematioa, and that the 
reason for using an artificial symbolic language was the 
inevitable vagueness and ambiguity of any language used for 
every-day purposes". (Russell (1944) 690.) Therefore the 
resolving of the question "whether a phrase is or is not a 
definite description (in a given proposition) depends on 
the logical form of that proposition, on how the proposition 
is to be analysed". (Linsky (1967) 63.) Definite descrip-
tions are introduced as incomplete symbols. "By an 'incom-
plete' symbol we mean a symbol which is not supposed to have 
any meaning in isolation, but is only defined in certain 
contexts," (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 66.) This means that 
the apparent grammatical subject expressed by the denoting 
phrase disappears in the process of the logical analysis 
and what remains is a complex logical structure of different 
constituents which have not been transparent in the previous 
linguistic formulation. In this sense the definite descrip-
tion (e. g. "the author of Waverley") differs from a true 
proper name i. e. "Scott", being an incomplete symbol it'has 
a meaning in use, but not in isolation. "For 'the author of 
Wayerley- cannot mean the same as 'Scott', or 'Scott is the 
author of Waverley' would mean the same as 'Sott is Scott', 
which it plainly does not; nor can 'the author of Waverley' 
mean anything other than 'Scott', or 'Scott is the author 
of Waverley' would be false, Hence 'the author of Waverley' 
means nothing." (Whitehead-Russell (.1910) 67.) Therefore 
there can be no general definition of the meaning of a defi-
nite description, but only a definition of the uses of its 
symbol, i. e. "the propositions in whose symbolic expression 
it occurs." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 67.) The definite de-
scription itself is formulated as (i x) (<)> x) , its meaning 
can, however, be given in respect with a proposition, e. g. 
•The author of Waverley was a poet'. "This implies that (1) 
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Waverley was written, (2) that it was written by one 
man, and not in collaboration, (3) that the one man who 
wrote it was a poet. If any one of these fails, the proposi-
tion is false. Thus 'the author of ''Slawkenburgius on 
Noses'' was a poet' is false, because no such book was ever 
written: "the author of ''The Maid's Tragedy'' was a poet' 
is false, because this play was written by Beaumont and 
Fletcher jointly. These two possibilities of falsehood do 
not arise if we say 'Scott was a poet'. Thus our interpreta-
tion of the uses of (ix) (<)>x) must be such as to allow for 
them. Now taking to replace 'x wrote Waverley', it is 
plain that any statement appearently about (.ix) (ij>x) requires 
(.1). (3x).(<j>x) and (2) jx-fy? •x=y; here (1) states 
x r y 
that at least one object satisfies <px, while (2) states that 
at most one object satisfies $x. The two together are equi-
valent to (3c) : (fx- = • 4>x = c, which we defined as 
E! (ix) (4>x) ". (Whitehead-Russell (.1910) 68.) E! is the sec-
ondary predicate existence, the above formalized criterion 
means that there must exist the unique object referred to 
by the definite description. Russell's two most important 
definitions for definite descriptions are: . • 
14.01. [(3x)(4>x)] r(ix) (<f>x) = O c ) (x) Of 
[ (.(J>x) h (x = c) & 0|>c) ]. 
(Whitehead-Russell (1910) 175. We give the definition in a 
more easily understandable modern transcription.) This def-
inition expresses the above mentioned criteria: there is 
at least one object c, there is at most one object c that 
satisfies <j>x and this object disposes of the predicate i¡) as 
well. Or in Russell's formulation: "... 'the term satisfying 
j>x satisfies tyx' is defined as meaning: 'There is a term c 
such that (1) is always equivalent to ''.x is c'', (2) 
1¡10 is true"'. CRussell (1919a) 178.) The second definition 
states the existence-criterion: 
14.02. E! (ix) (fx) (3c) (x) (fx). 5 (x — c). 
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In Whitehead-Russell (1910) we find, besides this general 
introduction to definite description, a typology of its 
forms according to the syntactic category of the predicate 
determining the argument bound by the iota operator. In the 
quoted example "author" was reducible to the predicate 
"write", a transitive verb the grammatical object ("Waver-
ley") of which was given so that the prescriptions applied 
in general to the argument bound by the iota operator with-
out any distinction with respect to the syntactic role ful-
filled by this argument or by the predicate which determi-
nates it. If the predicate is a relation, several descrip-
tions may be distinguished. The general case of a descrip-
tive function is "R'y = (,x) CxRy) Df. That is, 'R'y' is to 
mean the term x which has the relation R to y". (Whitehead-
-Russell (1910) 232.) The relation itself may be defined as 
converse of a relation e. g. "less", versus "greater" (cf. 
238-241.) or the relative product of two relations e. g. 
"father" x "father" = "paternal grandfather" (cf. 256-264.). 
Relations with limited domains and converse domains, e. g. 
""brother" and "sister" express the same relation (that of 
a common parentage), with the domain limited in the first 
case to males, in the second to feiusles" (265. CT. 265—267«). 
For relations with limited fields cf. (277-278.). Plurality 
of descriptive functions can be taken into account with 
respect to the referents and relata of a given relation, 
thus "e. g. R is the relation of parent to son, S'y = the 
parents of y, S'x = the sons of a;", (cf. 242-246.) but even 
a special plural descriptive function "R''6" is introduced 
to mean 'the terms which have the relation R to members of 
e'" (279. cr. 279-295.). A number of non-propositional func-
tions existing between two classes, or two relations, or any 
class and a relation are called double descriptive functions, 
by means of which new relations and classes can be introduc-
ed and lay the foundations for the definition of operation 
(296-298.) The definition of unit class allows for a new 
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analysis of definite descriptions. As a new descriptive 
function we have "i'x, meaning 'the class of terms which 
are identical with x', which is the same thing as 'the class 
whose only member is a;'. We are thus to have i'x=y(y=x)". 
(340.) We can define the number 1 by means of the unit class, 
it is "defined as the class of unit classes, i. e. 
1 = a{(3x)•a = t'x} Df. This leads to 
f- :.a£l. = : (3x) : y 6 a . = . y = x. From this it ap-
pears further that 
I- : a £ 1. = . E! (ix) (xGa) , 
whence A 
b : z (<j>z) 1. = . El Ux) Gj>x) , A 
i.e. 'z Ux) is a unit class' is equivalent to 'the x 
satisfying <j>x exists'. 
If a 6 1, i'a is the only member of a, for the only 
member of a is the only term to which a has the relation 
Thus ' i ' a' takes the place of ' (ix) (jpx):', if a stands for 
zUz)." (.36.) 
As to the indefinite description we have no comparable 
formal analysis at our disposal. In Russell (1905b) we are 
told that it does not denote many terms, but it denotes am-
biguously, i. e. it denotes an ambiguous term. (cf. Russell 
(1905b) 41.) He analyses the proposition "I met a man" in 
the following way: '"I met x, and x is human" is not always 
false." Generally, defining the class of men as the class 
of objects having the predicate human, we say that: 'C 
(a man)' means '"c(.x) and x is human" is not always false. 
This leaves 'a man', by itself, wholly destitute of meaning, 
but gives a meaning to every proposition in whose verbal 
expression 'a man' occurs." (Russel (1905b) 43.) Some 
further explications are to be found in Russell (1919a). 
Russell sets out from the same example and begins with the 
following proposal: "let us assume ... that my assertion is 
true, and that in fact I met Jones. It is clear that what 
I assert is not 'I met Jones". I may say 'I met a man, but 
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it was not Jones'; in that case, though I lie, I do not 
contradict myself, as I should do if when I say I met a man 
I really mean that I met Jones. It is clear also that the 
person to whom I am speaking can understand what I say, 
even if he is foreigner and has never heard of Jones. 
But we may go further: not only Jones, but no actual 
man, enters into my statement. This becomes obvious when the 
statement is false, since then there is no more reason why 
Jones should be supposed to enter into the proposition than 
why anyone else should. Indeed the statement would remain 
significant, though it could not possibly be true, even if 
there were no man at all. 'I met a unicorn' or 'I met a 
sea-serpent' is a perfectly significant assertion, if we 
know what it would be to be a unicorn or a sea-serpent, i. 
e. what is the definition of these fabulous monsters. Thus 
it is only what we may call the concept that enters into the 
proposition." (Russell (1919a) 167-168.) In a word, the indef-
inite description is explained by means of an existential 
operator, the uniqueness is not explicitly claimed but it 
could be assured with the same syntactic means as in the 
case of the definite description; as for the semantic in-
terpretation the only criterion consists in the significance 
of the proposition, the involved relationship is denota-
tional in so far as the semantic role of the existential 
operator and the uniqueness point to effective connexions, 
however, the content of the relationship itself remains in 
the generality of concepts (cf. Quine (1939).) . We bring our 
short overview on Russell's early and later conceptions con-
cerning semantics and denotation to an end here. We aimed at 
a comprehensive summary of his most important notions and 
ideas without their deeper critical evaluation, it serves as 
a necessary background to our inquiry into Russel's views on 
fictionality. 
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2. Our overview on descriptions ended with the question 
concerning reality or non-reality of the objects denoted by 
indefinite descriptions, the discussion of semantical and 
denotational problems led to fictionality and this is no 
mere chance: the formulation of the later, classical variant 
,, of the theory of denotation was at the same time a continu-
ous reflection on different aspects of fictionality. The 
formation of this theory can be understood as a revision of 
Russell's own realistic conception and one of the aims of 
this revision was to get rid of fictitious entities by means 
of an adequate methodology. Some months before the compre-
hensive study "On Denoting" there appeared another article 
by Russell in Mind (Russell (1905a)) expressing already the 
new theoretic position in the form of a criticism of MacColl. 
MacColl formulated in MacColl (1905) a logical theory which 
according to its ontological position can be considered as 
a Meinongian variant. MacColl wants namely to incorporate 
among the individuals of logic not only those which denote 
real existences, but also those which refer to non-exist-
ences, "that is to say, (to) unrealities, such as centaurs, 
nectar, ambrosia, fairies, with self-contradiction, such as 
round-squares, square circles, flat spheres, etc." (MacColl 
(1905) 308.) and considers classes consisting of real ex-
istences, of unrealities and mixed classes; in this way the 
single null class of algebra is substituted by an infinitude 
of pure and mixed classes consisting of fictitious elements 
which require a special treatment and interpretation. This 
view challanges Russell's new conception concerning seman-
tics and denotation; on the basis of his logical and theo-
retical insights he has no longer any understanding for 
Meinongian solutions, and from this point on the special 
Russellian theory of denotation conflicts with ideas. This 
theory of denotation is one of the main sources of Russell's 
views on fictionality, so we are going to inquire into some 
of the theses concerning some aspects of fictionality set up 
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on the basis of this theory of denotation in his works. 
2.1. An essential problem of fictionality is the question 
of existence. The critical article (Russell (1905a)), be-
gins also with an investigation of th& meaning of "exist-
ence". Russell states: "There are two meanings of this word, 
as distinct as stocks in a flower-garden and stocks on the 
Stock Exchange, which yet are continually being confused or 
at least supposed somehow connected. ... 
(a) The meaning of existence which occurs in philosphy and 
daily life is the meaning which can be predicated of an in-
dividual: the meaning in which we inquire whether God exists, 
in which we affirm that Socrates existed, and deny that Ham-
let existed. The entities dealt with in mathematics do not 
exist in this sense: the number 2, or the principle of the 
syllogism, or multiplication are objects which mathematics 
considers, but which certainly form no part of the world of 
existent things. This sense of existence lies wholly out-
side Symbolic Logic, which does not care a pin whether its 
entities exist in this sense or not. 
(b) The sense in which existence is used in symbolic logic 
is a definable and purely technical sense, namely this: To 
say that A exists means that A is a class which has at least 
one member. Thus whatever is not a class (e. g. Socrates) 
does not exist in this sense; and among classes there is just 
one which does not exist, namely, the class having no mem-
bers, which is called the null-class." (Russell (1905a) 
98-99.) This conception of confronting syntactically and 
semantically two meanings of "existence" was, however, only 
a transitory opinion, it was implied by the realist convic-
tion that numbers are objects differing from realia and 
their way of existence must be distinguished from the exist-
ence of things. This distinction was introduced in order to 
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prohibit drawing consequences from the realia to the class 
of numbers but it was not intended to dissolve the unity 
of objects; quite on the contrary, by means of the principle 
of extensionality a unique way of explication is give 1 for 
objects belonging to both ontological classes. "Suppose we 
say: 'No chimeras exist'. We may mean that the class of 
chimeras has no members, i. e. does not exist in sense (b), 
or that nothing that exists in sense (a) is a chimera. 
These two are equivalent in the present instance, because if 
there were chimeras, they would be entities of the kind that 
exist in sense (a). But if we say 'no numbers exist', our 
statement is true in sense (a) and false in sense (b). It is 
true that nothing that exists in sense (a) is a number; it 
is false that the class of numbers has no members. Thus the 
confusion arises from undue preoccupation with the things 
that exist in sense (a), which is a bad habit engendered by 
practical interests." (Russell (1905a) 99.) In this way it 
is understandable that the logical analysis is Principia 
Mathematica puts an end to the ambiguous explicability of 
this term and the view summarized in (a) is considered as a 
current but erroneous conception; the unique explication is 
based on a developed form of the thesis of extensionality 
which gets a nominalistically based semantic interpretation 
in the later philosophical writings. But let us see first 
the syntactical definition: "When, in ordinary language or 
in philosophy, something is said to 'exist', it is always 
something described, i.e. it is not something immediately 
presented, like a taste or a patch of colour, but someting 
like 'matter' or 'mind' or 'Homer' (meaning 'the author of 
the Homeric poems'), which is known by description as 'the 
so-and-so', and is thus of the form (i x) (<¡> x) . Thus in all 
such cases, the existence of the (grammatical) subject 
(» x) (<p x) can be analytically inferred from any true pro-
position having this grammatical subject. It would seem 
that the word 'existence' cannot be significantly applied to 
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subjects immediately given; i. e. not only does our defini-
tion give no meaning to 'E!x', but there is no reason, in 
philosophy, to suppose that a meaning of existence could be 
found which would be applicable to immediately given sub-
jects." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 174-175. A similar ex-
plication is to be found in Russell (1919a) 178-179.) The 
sense of this standpoint is that "exist" may appear as 
grammatical predicate in connection with an apparent proper 
name, but this constituent cannot be considered as a logi-
cal proper name, but only as a description, and existence is 
not to be evaluated as a logical first class predicate, but 
as a second class predicate having a description for its 
argument. The first part of this thesis is based on Rus-
sell's theory of knowledge; he is of the opinion in this 
case that a direct acquaintance is not expressible. The 
categorical postulation that the proposition 'This exists' 
has no significance seems rather doubtful, expecially if we 
take into account the considerations in Moore (1936) 186-
-188.: it seems to be an artificial decision, the principle 
of acquaintance cannot convince us of the illegitimity*of 
the use of "this" or of "exists" in the proposition "This 
exists" which appears to have significance and consequently 
a propositional meaning. On the other hand this analysis 
points to a very important syntactical-semantical distinc-
tion: "existence" is to be separated from the attributive 
first class predicates expressing certain properties, this 
insight has important philosophical consequences (cf. 
Kneale (1936)) and this has been observed in modern inten-
sional logic as well (cf. Montage (1974), von Kutschera 
(1976)). 
Existence in Russell's sense was defined by means of 
the equation 14.02 that has been quoted in part 2.23 above, 
Russell gives the following verbal explication of this de-
finition: "'the x satisfying 4>x exists' is to mean 'there 
is an object a such that is true when x is a but not 
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otherwise." (Whitehead-Russell (1910) 31.) This definition 
permits the use of an existence-predicate with a description 
as an argument in cases in which the description can be ana-
lysed as an expression which is bound by a non-negative ex-
istential operator, and defines the uniqueness of the bound 
variable i. the secondary predicate "exist" can only in 
that case significantly be applied to a description if there 
is an object which this description denotes in reality. This 
means that the condition of the use of the existence predi-
cate is the applicability of the existential operator to the 
arguments in an extensional sense, i. e. the predicate "ex-
ist" can be used in connection with a description if the 
latter can be interpreted as a class having only one unique 
real member. This implies a principle of translation which 
has to be applied to each grammatical apparent proper name 
and as a result of the transcription it clearly formulates 
the extensional relations between a class and its unique 
member in the positive case. In the case that this logical 
scheme is not assured, i. e. if there are no objects, we 
are confronted with descriptions which have significance 
but are to be considered as false because the bound vari-
ables do not denote anything. This class of false descrip-
tions or of descriptions with non-existing denotation in-
volves fictitious objects too. Besides fictionality we ought 
to mention in this context some other types of utterances as 
well, such as lies, errors, and different strategies or con-
ventions which may obtain in certain connexions a negative 
evaluation etc., however this would take us from our seman-
tical point of view. Therefore we do not try to define these 
pragmatic distinctions and in connection.with fictionality 
we shall refer, without further distinction, to this class 
defined by a non-existing denotation and we do not want to 
presuppose any general pragmatical rules e. g. whether the 
speaker considers the objects as fictitious or not or how 
the interpreter chooses between different possibilities, 
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etc. We shall consider for the time being the logical lan-
guage of the analysis as a sort of ideal language is Rus-
sell's sensci, a metalanguage revealing the inner structure 
of natural language. (As to "lie" consider Russell (1940) 
194.) We have in this sense a clear program concerning fic-
tionality, we have to rewrite the apparent proper names of 
natural language as descriptions and if the objcct denoted 
by the description cannot be explained as a class that has 
one member the proper name is to be taken as fictitious. In 
answer to MacColl's proposal about classes of unrealities, 
centaurs, round squares, etc. Russell explains his stand-
point: "Concerning all these we shall say simply that they 
arc clnsscs which have no members, so that each of them is 
identical with the null class. There are no Centaurs; 'x is 
a Centaur' is false whatever value we give to x, even when 
we include values which do not exist in sense (a), such as 
numbers, propositions, etc. Similarly, there are no round 
squares. The case of noctar and ambrosia is more difficult, 
since these seem to be individuals, not classes. But here we 
must presuppose definitions of nectar and ambrosias they are 
substances having such and such properties, which, as a mat-
ter of fact, no substances do have. Wo have thus merely a 
defining concept for each, without any entity to which the 
concept applies. In this case, the concept is an entity, but 
it docs denote anything. To take a simpler case: 'The pre-
sent King of England' is a complex concept denoting an indi-
vidual; 'the present King of France' is a simiiar complex 
denoting nothing. The phrase intends to point out an indi-
vidual, but fails to do so: it does not point out an unreal 
individual, but no individual at all. The same explanation 
applies to mythical personages, Apollo. Priam, etc. These 
words have a meaning, which can be found by looking thorn up 
in a classical dictionary;- but the have not a denotation: 
there is no entity, real or Imaginary, which they point out" 
(Russell (1905a) 100.) The last remark may be completed by 
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the following analysis: "A proposition such as 'Apollo 
exists' is really of the same logical form, although it 
does not explicitly contain the word the. For 'Apollo' means 
really 'the object having such-and-such properties,' say 
'the object having the properties enumerated in the Classi-
cal Dictionary." (The same principle applies to many uses of 
the proper names of existent object, e. g. to all uses of 
proper names for objects known to the speaker only by re-
port, and not by personal acquaintance.) If these properties 
make up the propositional function fx, then 'Apollo' means 
(i x) (<p x) , and 'Apollo exists' means 'El (i x) (<t> x) :" 
(Whitehead-Russell (1910) 31.) 
Although logical analysis is not strictly regulated as, 
for example, categorial grammar is, the main problems are 
not raised by it. Our principal concern is to find an ade-
quate test by means of which it can be unambigously decided 
to which category an item belongs. We rewrite the proper 
names of grammar and now we must choose all those which can-
not be considered as fictional units. A class of the bound 
variables which prove to be unique and have certain proper-
ties can be put together on the basis that I have direct 
acquaintance with them. These are particulars perceived in 
space-time such as "my father", 'ray son", and if self-aware-
ness is allowed even "myself". As each item depends on my 
personal perception and my own perspective each is idio-
syncratically and specially mine: if I speak of "myself" and 
your refer to me there is an essential difference in the way 
I am and you are aware of me as mind and body and as source 
of perception. But the same difference can be maintained 
with each object of a direct acquaintance, they are intro-
duced as items of a highly individual perceptional process, 
(cf. in this connection Russell (1910-1911) 206-208.) "A 
table viewed from one place presents a different appearence 
from that which it presents from another place. This is the 
language of common sense ..." (Russell (1914) 84.) The lan-
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guage of common sense is however presupposed to be the 
basis for natural language: its inner content appears to be 
determined by the structure of our perception. This is the 
rase not only for objects which X am aware of in a di ect 
process of acquaintance, whenever I know some object, even 
if my knowledge is mediated by a description given by some-
body else, my individual perception takes part in this 
process and determines its subjective character. But if lan-
guage is to this extent subjective and exclusively deter-
mined by individual perception one may raise the question 
of why and how a communication or an exchange of these 
highly individual contents should take place, how we can 
escape a form of sollipsism? As to the last problem Rus-
sell's characteristic argumentation is the following: 
"... we can never prove the existence of things other than 
ourselves and our experiences. No logical absurdity results 
from the hypothesis that the world consists of myself and 
my thoughts and feelings and sensations, and that every-
thing else is mere fancy." (Russell (1912) 33.) However, 
"every principle of simplicity urges us to adopt the natu-
ral view, that there really are objects other than our- . 
selves and our sense-data which have an existence not de-
pendent upon our perceiving them." (Russell (1912) 37.) 
Besides the principle of simplicity there is an instinctive 
belief and the testimony of physics that speak for a reality 
of the external world even if there is no complete corre-
spondendance between our sense-data and the objects of the 
external world. This opinion shows clearly the insensitive-
ness that Russel had with respect to the soclo-cultural 
determination in the use of signs. This must be emphasised 
in spite of Russell's numerous, in some respects very in-
structive socio-logical, historical, pedagogical and poli-
tical studies some results of which were taken into account 
in his last comprehensive work Russell (1948), e. g. in the 
genealogy of sign use by means of animal inference, analogy, 
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scientific methods, etc. (Russell ( 1948) 198-210.) But 
even here his fundamental ideas remained the same: sign 
and language are primarily defined by perception. If the 
pragmatical dimension of communication is simply overxooked, 
if the use of signs is considered in the sense of the empir-
icist and idealistic tradition of the XVIIIth century with 
respect to an abstract man appearing only through his 
psycho-physiologi cal faculties and not as being a represn— 
tative of a historical, sociological and cultural community, 
then the use of sign loses its proper sense. Communication 
can only be understood as an interaction between member of 
a community, a sort of game in which they take part accord-
in- to the conventional rules of the community. This insight 
must be used for the definition of the objects we are speak-
ing of, i. e. the definition of fictional objects and their 
relation to existence, in this case the conventional element 
is a corrective factor unifying the ways of perception in a 
certain community in a certain space-time. We think that if 
we know an object it is not only important whether we know 
it by direct acquaintance or by a description, but also 
which model we follow in the perception or generally in the 
process of awareness. If I am a soldier in a war I do not 
perceive "a man" in general, but as enemy or friend or neu-
tral person and I act according to norms which appear in 
peace time inhuman and abnormal. The object is differently 
perceived in socially or culturally different situations 
and this means that we never have the true image of facts, 
as Russell assumes, in language or in perception, percep-
tion and image are always conventionally influenced and 
manipulated. 
The role of social and cultural factors ia even more 
important in cases of acquaintance by description. The per-
ceived communication puts a description at my disposal 
which I can rewrite in the given logical form. In this case 
I am not acquainted with the bound variable and it depends 
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on me whether I ascribe to it an existence on the basis of 
the speaker's personal acquaintance or on the basis of a 
direct acquaintance by somebody else to which an unbroken 
causal chain leads from the speaker. If I accept that in 
both cases the original proposition becomes involved in my 
beliefs, i. e. the propositional attitude of the proposi-
tion changes, it becomes a belief-proposition, an inten-
sional structure that, according Russell's correct analysis, 
cannot be characterized by means of the extensional method. 
(Russell (1918-1919) 216-228.) However, with the intension-
ality there appear some other difficulties which have been 
pointed out by several critics of Russell's denotation 
theory, (cf. Linsky (1967) 67-84. Hintikka (1981)). From our 
point of view it is very important to see that the belief-
system is organized by conventional norms. There is a well 
distinguishable difference in readiness to believe the 
statements of foreigners: there are early centuries full of 
wonders and miracles, later on as scientific control spreads 
and achieves universal authority they are limited to social 
strate which hold out for the old beliefs. Fictionality, 
fictional objects, fictional existence are conjoined to a 
socio-cultural game in which there is a convention that the 
speaker need not refer to real persons and other objects in 
telling a narrative. The appearance of this fictional narra-
tive is certainly secondary to story-telling in which this 
possibility was not given, where everything had to be con-
sidered as true, e. g. in sagas and in myths. 
But how can these ideas be approached from the Rus-
sellian theory of fictionality and how can they be explained 
in a formally correct semantics? Russell uses in fact some 
generic terms such as narrative, novel, drama, etc, but we 
cannot state any essential regularity concerning theoretical 
formulation of genres or other textual units having conven-
tionality as their basis, (cf. below the discussion in 3.2.) 
However there are some other more or less nominalistically 
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based - in our terminology "Russellian" - studies on fic-
tionality of which we mention two here: Reichenbach (194 7) 
and Lieb (1981) that may point out a way towards conven-
tionally defined fictionality. Reichenbach appreciated Rus-
sell's logical work very highly (cf. Reichenbach (1944) and 
they influenced each other very directly. In Reichenbach 
(1947) we have the first comprehensive attempt to explain 
natural language by means of symbolic logic, in this way 
fictionality is also dealt with. The main novelty in com-
parison with Russell consists in qualifying the existence 
of fictionality, i. e. binding it to a certain type or genre 
of utterances. There are some remarkable disagreements be-
tween this approach and Rusell's conception, so the rela-
tion between the physical level of language and the level 
determined by direct perceptions has a different order in 
Reichenbach than in Russell: Reichenbach thinks that physi-
cal existence is introduced by the existential operator, 
i. e. "the sort of existence applying to concrete objects 
of our daily environment as well as to the objects discov-
ered by the methods of science" (Reichenbach (1948) 274.) 
constitutes the primary non-fictitious level in language.. 
The objects of perception counting as primitive elements of 
language in Russell are considered as the first examples of 
fictitious existence in Reichenbach. "We speak of seeing an 
object not only if the object is physically present; we say 
that we see certain objects also when dreaming, or when 
looking at physical objects of a different sort ... Such 
objects are fictitious; but it is convenient to deal with 
them as though they were real objects. We shall call them 
subjective things. The name immediate things will be used 
... to include both objective things which are perceived 
and subjective things; thus if a thing is immediate it is 
left open whether it is at the same time objective." 
(Reichenbach (1947) 274.) Russell's primitive objects are 
immediate things, according to the analysis in 3.2. Let us 
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enumerate first the different sorts of existence without 
any deeper analysis of the structures introduced by Reichen-
bach. After a general characterisation we shall deal more 
thoroughly with one type of fictitious existence. "A second 
sort of fictitious existence ... extends the domain of 
existence much farther than does immediate existence. Fol-
lowing the second conception, we speak of existence whenever 
the assumption of physical existence is not contradictory. 
We thus introduce a category of logical existence ..." 
(Reichenbach (1947) 276.) "A third sore of existence appears 
in statements which refer to ... propositional attitudes" 
jReichenbach (1947) 277.) The next "form of fictitious ex-
istence refers to what may be called intentional objects 
... When we conceive terms like "desire1, 'plan', 'attempt', 
as functions, we ... are compelled to interpret" the prin-
ciple of existential generalization, "as referring to a fic-
titious existence." (Reichenbach (1947) 280.) The last form 
of fictitious existence mentioned by Reichenbach is literary 
existence which is defined with respect to "fictitious ob-
jects whose existence is assumed when sentences concerning 
such objects are stated in a book. The fictitious existence 
of these objects ... is therefore translatable into the 
physical existence of sentences in a book." (Reichenbach 
(1947) 282.) 
This typology of different sorts of existence is based 
on an essentially extensional logic of the Russellian type, 
however the intention to map all the relevant connections 
of conversational language on to a logical analysis led to 
the first formulation of some concepts of intensional log-
ics. The formulation itself remained true to the exten-
sional and the Russellian empiricist and behavioristic 
ideas. As an example we may consider the existence conjoin-
ed with intentional objects in the following sentence: 
(3) Peter desires to live in New York 
- 336 -
As a first step it is formalised in the following way: 
(3) • (3v)ln[f(Xl,yi) JMv) .ds(x rv) 
"Here ,f(x1,y1)' means 'Peter lives in New York', and 'ds ' 
means 'desires'. The particle 'to', in this interpretation, 
is regarded as introducing event-splitting." (Reichenbach 
(1947) 281.) In a second step the intentional objects are 
defined in terms of the psychological notion of fulfillment 
and (3)' is translated into physical existence: 
(3) ' ' (3 z) bst (x^ , z) . [f (x »y^iff (Z) ] 
"Here 'bst' means 'bodily state' ... 'ff* means 'fulfill-i 
ment* (Reichenbach (1947) 281.) and 3 means a conncective 
implication. However nowadays the translation is not direct-
ed to "bodily state" as in the days of behaviorism but to 
"logically possible worlds".' This new concept has not been 
without objection. The question is raised whether this 
notion is well founded ontologically. Before this problem 
became so hotly debated Russell had touched on this topic 
several times and developed a rather ambiguous standpoint in 
this respect. Mainly in connection with physics he liked to 
formulate his ideas with respect to different possible 
worlds (cr. Russell (1927a) 89. (1914) 190, in connection 
with ethic Russell (1910)), but his ideas concerning the 
perceptual foundation of language led him to a consequent 
negation of the hypothesis of possible worlds: "Logic, I 
should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology 
can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as 
truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general 
features. To say that unicorns have an existence in her-
aldy, or in literature, or in imagination, is a most pitiful 
and paltry evasion. What exists in heraldy is not an animal, 
made of flesh and blood, moving and breathing of its own 
initiative. What exists is. a picture, or a description in 
words. Similarly, to maintain that Hamlet, for example, 
exists in his own world, namely in the world of Shakespeare's 
imagination, just as truly as (say) Napoleon existed in the 
ordinary world, is to say something delibaretaly confusing. 
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or else confused to a degree which is scarcely credible. 
There is only one world, the 'real' world: Shakespeare's 
imagination is part of it, and the thoughts that he had in 
writing Hamlet are real. So are the thoughts that we have 
in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fic-
tion that only the thoughts, feelings, etc. in Shakespeare 
and in his readers are real, and that there is not, in ad-
dition to them, an objective Hamlet. When you have taken 
account of all the feelings roused by Napoleon in writers 
and readers of history, you have not touched the actual 
man; but in the case of Hamlet you have come to the end of 
him. If no one thought about Hamlet, there would be nothing 
left of him; if no one had thought about Napoleon, he would 
soon have seen to it that some one did. The sense of reality 
is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with it by pretending 
that Hamlet has another kind of reality is doing a disser-
vice to thought." (Russell (1919a) 169-170.) We think that 
this last opinion corresponds to the nominalistic stand-
point. In this context we do not wish to deal with inten-
sional logic, therefore the inner problems of the different 
kinds of existence as far as they can be considered topics 
of different philosophical logics will not be discussed 
here. 
Reichenbach followed Russell in formulating "that fic-
titious objects cannot be given proper names. They can only 
be described and therefore are expressed by means or vari-
ables bound by qualified existential operators. The word 
'Hamlet', therefore, is not a proper name, but an abbrevia-
tion standing for the description of a fictitious personal-
ity." (Reichenbach (1947) 283.) The last remark - a des-
cription of a fictitious personality - proves the novelty 
of Reichenbach"s approach and reveals the essence of the 
extension of applicability of truth and falsehood. Russell 
was of the opinion: "We experience 'Hamlet', not Hamlet; 
but our emotions in reading the play have to do with Hamlet, 
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not with 'Hamlet'. 'Hamlet' is a word of six letters; 
whether it should be or not be is a question of little in-
terest, and it certainly could not make its quietus with 
a bare bodkin. Thus the play 'Hamlet' consists entirely of 
false propositions, which transcend experience, but which 
are certainly significant, since they can arouse emotions. 
When I say that our emotions are about Hamlet, not "Ham-
let", I must qualify this statement: they are really not 
about anything, but we think they are about the man named 
'Hamlet'. The propositions in the play are false because 
there was no such man; they are significant because we know 
from experience the noise 'Hamlet', the meaning of 'name', 
and the meaning of'man'. The fundamental falsehood in the 
play is the proposition; the noise 'Hamlet' is a name'. 
(Russell (1940) 277.) Russell's analysis acknowledges only 
one sort of existence which could be qualified in Reichen-
bach" s terminology as immediate existence and tries to 
explain the significance of a fictitious and consequently 
false sentence by means of emotions. But this is a rather 
dangerous and uncontrollable solution; it is undefined in 
which cases emotions can win against pure rationality and 
in this way it may institutionalize irrationality in cer-
tain fields of life. Instead of that rather difficult 
approach Reichenbach's consequent extension of truth and 
falsehood to these special sorts of existence is very con-
vincing. Certainly we must not confound the languages of the 
different existences: what may appear as existent on the one 
level is considered empty on the other. This level-relativ-
ity emphasizes the one-sidedness and negativity of the Rus-
seilian standpoint: fictional sentences considered from the 
point of view of physical or immediate existence must be 
held as false, however they are not conceived of as elements 
of this language, they belong to the level of fictionality 
which disposes of special criteria of truth and falsehood. 
Reichenbach's proposal for the definition of literary 
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existence was to use the physical existence of senteces 
in a book. This is a very essential step; in a fictional 
text there exists only what is introduced as existent or 
whose existence can be inferred on the basis of the text. 
In some respects the definition proves to be too loose: 
being stated in a book does not quarantee that the text is 
of a literary character. Therefore Reichenbach admits a def-
inition which translates "literary existence into the ex-
istence of images and emotions in the reader. The interpre-
tation will lead to a fictitious existence similar to im-
mediate existence." (Reichenbach (1947) 282.) This is Rus-
sell's idea and we shall have to say something about it in 
3.2. but we must express already here our conviction that 
it is an essentially weaker solution than the first one as 
it does not allow any combination of the structure with 
socio-cultural convention. The combination did not succeed 
in this case, Reichenbach had to include, besides the def-
inition, general laws accounting for the psychological 
authenticity of the work: "The behavior of the fictitious 
persons in their fictitious environment should be so pre-
sented that it satisfies the laws of psychology holding for 
actual persons; in other words, the laws assumed for the 
behavior of the fictitious persons should be objeatively 
true. ... A further requirement is that the laws expressed 
by the behavior of the fictitious persons play an important 
role in our own lives and therefore hels us to understand 
human behavior in general." (Reichenbach (1947) 282.) These 
requirements are too general and too absolute, it is fal-
lacious if one wants to have a general law for life and all 
kinds of literature, we must rather admit a great number of 
different codes for literary genres which need not in each 
respect correspond to the rules of our life. The aspect of 
relativity has been increasingly taken into account in those 
works on fictionality which are based on a Meinongian pos-
sible world semantics (cf. Kanyó (1980a)), the importance of 
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the nominal istic contribution is not less, however we cannot 
give a systematic picture of the development of this re-
search here. There no special fictional objects are looked 
for, it is rather tne way of the linguistic formulation that 
is in the centre of scientific reflection; fictionality has 
to be understood as a consequence of the conventional use of 
language. As a very impressive example we shall briefly men-
tion Lieb (1981). In this reasonably formulated study Lieb 
lays the foundations for a formal theory of fictionality. He 
assumes in accordance with Searle (1975) that the fictional 
text is embedded in pretence which plays the role of a pro-
positional attitude (cf. Lieb (1981) 552.). He wants to in-
clude several propositional attitudes, which would serve as 
criteria of classification and "cut right across literary 
genres" (552.). There are different formal definitions, the 
first determines how the referential constituents have to 
be understood on the basis of the grammar of the language. 
As a second step the referential constituents appear as the 
referential-expressions of concrete texts, they have textual 
meaning, a referential-doxastic meaning which is defined by 
means of new definitions. If a narrator is involved in the 
fictional text then the realization of the fictional text is 
attributed by the author to him, an appropriate place is 
assigned to the narrator in the formal system and referen-
tial expressions that involve a narrator are also correctly 
interpreteted. The most difficult case is the explication 
of the case in which there are normal proper names embedded 
in fictional texts, but Lieb's system can stand up to this 
challenge as he characterizes this case as a complex seman-
tic relation which "involves both the reference relation 
and the fictionality proviso." (558.) Thus Lieb's well-
founded formal system has enough adaptability to deal with 
problems like dependence on genre, conventionality and it 
comes very near to the ideas we have formulated in general 
terms above. 
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The Russellian definition of fictional existence leads 
to these reflections. We can establish that it has a double 
character: as a formal system it may be considered an in-
fluential starting point for semantical considerations of 
fictionality, but as to the philosophical and epistemolog-
ical interpretation of this system which appeared in reduc-
ing language to immediate objects and in declaring fictional 
existence for falsehood there is a negativity and an abso-
lutized one-sidedeness which do not admit the formulation of 
a coherent theory. As a matter of fact, there are different 
possible solutions in Russell's writings, the first is an 
agnostic one and follows from his theory of knowledge: if 
there is a fictional entity introduced into the elements 
which according to our knowledge and our beliefs build up 
the world we have no method at our disposal to indicate that 
it has practically no reference. Russell is without doubt 
right in putting for the idea that in the knowledge of 
different communities there are undetected fictional enti-
ties and if we want to rely on the most secure grounds we 
must take the language of science - first of all physics ' 
and psycho-physiology- into account. This analysis again-
leaves out of consideration the pragmatic dimension of 
knowledge and beliefs, the socio-cultural rules which deter-
mine the emergence and the development of conventions, their 
manipulation and all the forms of influencing the community. 
But Russell can provide us with a positive solution as well , 
that is worth while to be examining intensively. 
2.2. In adapting the perceptual phenomena as a basis for 
the interpretation of language Russell must have assumed not 
only the existence of perceptions such as can be verified by 
means of physics, but also the existence of impressions 
which occur ,in dreams, in hallucinations, in the imagination, 
etc. - as Reichenbach has clearly formulated, immediate » 
existence involves subjective existence. This sphere of sub-
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jective existence is named by Russell, according to the 
philosophical tradition, recapitulatively as imagination. 
In this section we want to summarize Russell's views on 
imagination with the intention of showing whether they can 
be connected with the theory of fictionality. 
The existence of imagination is not unproblematic in 
modern psycho-physiology: behaviorism, the trend which Rus-
sell highly appreciated because of its experimental methods, 
was extremely antimentalistic and did not accept introspec-
tion as a valid psychological method, therefore it led to 
the negation of imagination. Russell argues in Russell 
(1919b) for the existence of images and he does not admit 
the reducing of these phenomenona to the pronunciation of 
words sotto voce as Watson wished to solve this question. 
An image occurring in visualizing cannot be explained by 
behaviorist methods, it can at most be rejected, because one 
can be acquainted with it only through introspection and 
this method cannot be held for a source of knowledge accord-
ing to the behaviorists. But Russell sees no principal prob-
lem in introspection. Two reasons can be mentioned against 
this method, one is privacy, the other is the independence 
of the laws of physics. As for privacy Russell mentions 
that "we shall have to include among such date" which can be 
obtained only through introspection "all bodily sensations" 
(Russell (1919b). 294.), i. e. since there is a class of data 
that admit by their nature only an introspective observa-
tion, introspection cannot be excluded. Much more interest- . 
ing is the other argument, namely that the data of intro-
spection "do not obey the laws of physics ... I think it 
will be found that the essential characteristic of intro-
spective data is concerned with localization-, either they 
are not localized at all, or they are localized in a place 
already physically occupied by something which would be in-
consistent with them if they were regarded as part of the 
physical world. In either case, introspective data have to 
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be regarded as not obeying the laws of physics ..." (294-
-295}. Russell is aware of the challenge and as a reaction 
he builds up the phantastlc idea of a subjective existence 
which marks a new period in his theoretical interpretation 
of denotational relations mainly in the years 1914-1927 
which can be characterized by Wittgenstein's influence on 
logical atomism and by the intensive study of behaviorism 
and psycho-physiological connexions. Russell's main thesis 
consists of postulating existence for everything insofar as 
it is built on sensations even if the content of the sensa-
tions contradicts the laws of physics. "Phantoms and images 
do undoubtedly exist in that sense ... if you shut your eyes 
jtnd imagine some visual scene, the images that are before 
your mind while you are imagining are undoubtedly there. 
They are images, something is happening, and what is happen-
ing is that images are before your mind, and these images 
are just as much part of the world as tables and chairs and 
anything else. They are perfectly decent objects, and you 
only call them unreal (if you call them so), or treat them 
as non-existent, because they do not have the usual sort of 
relations to other objects ... If you imagine a heavy oak 
table, you can remove it without any muscular effort, which 
is not the case with oak tables that you actually see. The 
general correlations of your images are quite different 
from the correlations of what one chooses to call 'real' 
objects. But that is not to say images are unreal. It is 
only to say they are not part of physics. Of course, I know 
that this belief in the physical world has established a 
sort of reign of terror ... That sort of attitude is un-
worthy of a philosopher. We should treat with exactly equal 
respect the things that do not fit in with the physical 
world, and images are among them." (Russell (1918-1919) 
257.) 
The sphere' of imagination originally appeared in Russell 
(1914a) where the external world was interpreted by senses 
-data and all objects of sense were declared real (cf, 93f,). 
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In Russell (1914b)) we find the direct connection with the 
denotation theory: images are here explained as descrip-
tions. Russell expounds in this context that 'illusion* and 
'unreality' have to be derived from the fundamental pair 
'true' and 'false' which can be applied to propositions and 
descriptions, "but not to proper names: in other words, 
they have no application whatever to data, but only to en-
tities or non-entities described in terms of data. 
Let us illustrate this by the terms 'existence' and 
•non-existence'. Given any datum x, it is meaningless 
either to assert or to deny that x 'exists'. We might be 
tempted to say: "Of course x exists, for otherwise it could 
not be a datum'. But such a statement is really meaningless, 
although it is significant and true to say, 'My present 
sense-datum exists', and it may also be true that 'x is my 
present sense-datum'. The inference from these two proposi-
tions to 'x exists' is one which seems irresistible to peo-
ple unaccustomed to logic; yet the apparent proposition in-
ferred is not merely false, but strictly meaningless. To say 
'My present sense-datum exists' is to say (roughly): 'There 
is an object of which ''my present sense-datum'' is a de-
scription'. But we cannot say: 'There is an object of which 
••x'1 is a description', because 'x' is (in the case we are 
supposing) a name, not a description." (Russell (1914b) 
167-168.) This early contribution to the problem of imagina-
tion promises a sort of differentiation of existences in the 
method of Reichenbach: "Concerning the immediate objects in 
illusions, hallucinations, and dreams, it is meaningless to 
ask whether they 'exist' or are 'real'. There they are, and 
that ends the matter." (168.) This view allows for a posi-
tive account of fictionality as it is not to be considered 
as non-existence but as a particular variant of existence 
that should be characterized. However Russell who remained 
true to the notion of imagination did not undertake the sys-
tematic discussion of conventional language on a logical 
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basis and his philosophical interpretation of this problem 
presents different solutions. 
Terminologically we must distinguish between imagina-
tion which is applied to the whole mental process and image 
which represents a constituent of this process. Images are 
divided according to the fields of sensation into visual, 
auditory and tactile and we may ignore other kinds of images 
(.Russell (1927b) 184.) Images", imagination should be di-
stinguished from sensations, the differences has been sought 
generally 
"/1/ By the less degree of vivedness in images; 
/2/ By our absence of belief in their 'physical 
reality"; 
/3/ By the fact that their causes and~~eifects are 
different from those of sensations." (Russell 
(1921) 145.) 
But these arguments are not convincing, Russell means "that 
the test of liveliness, however applicable in ordinary 
instances, cannot be used to define the differences between 
sensations and images." (148.) Secondly he points out: 
"Images cannot be defined by the feeling of unreality, be-
cause when we falsely believe an image to be a sensation, as 
in the case of dreams, it feels just as real as if it were a 
sensation." (.149.). Therefore the grounds for the distinc-
tion are sought in causes and effects, but there are dif-
ferent definitions which try to formulate the essential dif-
ference, namely that sensations come through the sense-
-organs and are connected with the world of physics, while 
images represent mental processes that are independent from 
the laws of physics. The multiplicity of definitions shows 
Russell's inner uncertainty, his first contribution to this 
topic after its general exposition in two philosophical 
studies in 1914, Russell (1915), gives two different defini-
tions, and the reader may choose on the basis of his own 
reflections. The first definition has as its background the 
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recognition that "Sensation and imagination together ... may 
be defined as 'acquaintance with particulars not given as 
earlier than the subject." (Russell (1915) 33.) This last 
definition may be identified with "'particulars given as 
simultaneous with the subject.' But such identification pre-
supposes, what must not be assumed without discussion, that 
an experienced particular must be given as in some temporal 
relation with the subject. If- this can be denied, we may 
find here an intrinsic difference between sense and imagina-
tion. It may be that in the sense the object is given as 
'now', 1. e. as simultaneous with the subject, whereas in 
imagination the object is given without any temporal rela-
tion to the subject, i. e. to the present time." (Russell 
(1915) 33.) In this way the following two definitions may be 
given for imagination and sensation: "'Imagination' is 
acquaintance with particulars which are not given as having 
any temporal relation to the subject. 'Sensation' is ac-
quaintance with particulars given as simultaneous with the 
subject." (Russell (1915) 35.) But Russell is of the opinion 
that this interpretation may be rejected, the explanation to 
be substituted here must "allow that imagination and sensa-
tion are different relations to objects. ... if images have 
any given time-relation to the subject, it must be that of 
simultaneity; hence in this respect they will be indistin-
guishable from sense-data. We cannot hope ... in this case 
to explain the 'unreality' of images by the nature of the 
relation of imagining ... The 'unreality' of images may, on 
our present hypothesis, be defined as consisting merely in 
their failure to fulfil the correlations which are fulfilled 
by sense-data. ... images change in ways which are wholly 
contrary to the laws of physics; the laws of their changes 
seem, in fact, to be psychological rather than physical, 
involving reference to such matters as the subject's 
thoughts and desires." (42-43.) 
After Russell's intensive psycho-physiological studies 
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this provisory contribution to the theoretical foundations 
of irrationality was succeeded by a more scientific argumen-
tation: the physiological difference between sensation and 
image with respect to stimulus that was rejected in Russell 
(1915) 36. is considered as a possible basis for a defini-
tion: "... images have been defined as 'centrally excited 
sensations', i. e. sensations which have their physiological 
cause in the brain only ..." (Russell (1921) 150.). They 
stand clearly in opposition to sensations which are based on 
the sense-organs and the nerves connecting the sense-organs 
with the brain. But this explanation does not fit in with 
Russell's conception, it is replaced by another hypothesis 
tha.t_txies_to._gxplaln._the peculiarity of imagination by 
means of a special sort of ¿ausation which is named mnemic • 
and is based on mental connections: "... and image is occa-
sioned, through association, by a sensation or another image, 
in other words that it has a mnemic cause - which does not 
prevent it from also having a physical cause. ... Sensations, 
on the other hand, will only have physical causes." (120-
-121.). Russell hints at several possible solutions, but his 
ideas are not satisfactorily expounded in Russell (.1921) ; 
the most convincing explanation of this topic is to be found 
in Russell (1927b) which summerizes the different ideas con-
cerning images and generalizes some early conceptions. A 
central motive of the theory of imagination is that the 
image depends on earlier sensations, "an image is more or 
less vague, and has a number of similar sensations as its 
prototypes." (188.) The similitude and the criteria of re-
semblance are inquired into and Russell believes that there 
are" "innumerable methods ... by which you can test the 
likeness of an image to its prototype." (.190.) Russell's 
analysis concludes "that an image is an occurrence having 
the quality associated with stimulation by some sense-organ, 
but not due to such stimulation. In human beings, images 
seem to depend upon past experience, but perhaps in more 
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instinctive animals they are partly due to innate mechanism. 
... an 'image' is an occurrence recognisably visual (or au-
ditory or etc. as the case may be), but not caused by a 
stimulus which is of the nature of light (or sound or etc., 
as the case may be), or at any rate only indirectly so caus-
ed as a result of association." (192-193.) This conception 
is practically a generalisation of the theory concerning 
memory-images discussed in Russell (1921) , as images are not 
only constituents of imagination, but play an important role 
in memory and in word meaning. As to memory-images they "do 
not differ in their intrinsic qualities" from imagination-
-images. "They differ by the fact that the images that con-
stitute memories, unlike those that constitute imagination, 
are accompanied by a feeling of belief which may be express-
ed in the words 'this happened'. The mere occurrence of im-
ages, without this feeling of belief, constitutes imagina-
tion; it is the element of belief that is the distinctive 
thing in memory." (Russell (1921) 176.) Russell assumes that 
'the prototype of our memory-image did fit into a physical 
context, while our memory-image does not. This causes us to 
feel that the prototype was 'real', while the image is 
'imaginary'. (185). In immediate memory Russell deems to 
have found something that "bridges the gulf between sensa-
tions and the images which are their copies." (175.) It ap-
plies to the fading of a sensations: "At the beginning of a 
stimulus we have a sensation; then a gradual transition; and 
at the end an image." (175.) 
In the complex of meaning and thinking, images again 
play an important role according to Russell's considerations. 
One of the main questions is how words or images may occur 
in the absence of their objects. There is a behavioristic 
theory with respect to this connection but it is found to be 
restricted and inadequate, and is replaced by a theoretical 
approach which is, in spite of its declared anti-conventio-
nalism a pragmatic theory insofar as it arises out of the 
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use of language and gives definitions with respect to use. 
After distinguishing the active and passive understanding 
of a word or image he gives different ways of understanding 
words: 
"/1/ On suitable occasions you use the word 
properly. 
/2/ When you hear it, you act appropriately. 
/3/ You associate the word with another word (say 
in a different language) which has the appropri-
ate effect on behavior. 
/4/ When the word is being first learnt, you associ-
ate it with an object, which is what is "means'; 
thus the word acquires some of the same causal 
efficacy-as the-object. (Russell_(19_19b) 301.1 
The cases apply to a use of language which Russell names 
'demonstrative as they point out a feature in the present 
environment' (301.). However this is not the only use of 
language, the two sorts of images already mentioned memory-
-images and imagination-images, lay the ground for other 
uses of language: 
"•/5/ Words may be used to describe or recall a memory-
-image: to describe it when it already exists, or 
to recall it where the words exist as a habit and 
are known to be descriptive of some past experi-
ence. 
/6/ Words may be used to describe or create an imagi-
nation-image: to describe it, for example, in the 
case of a poet or novelist, or to create it in 
the ordinary case of giving information - though 
in the latter case, it is intended that the imagi 
nation-image, when created, shall be accompanied 
by belief that something of the sort has occurred 
(302.) 
These two u£es are named narrative use and imaginative use, 
and both of them indicate the use of words in thinking. 
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"... it is ... the possibility of a memory-image in the" 
speaker "and an imagination-image in the hearer that makes 
the essence of the narrative '•meaning'' of the words." 
(Russell (1921) 201.) "Images, as contrasted with sensa-
tions, are the response expected during a narrative; it is 
understood that present action is not called for. ... words 
used demonstratively describe and are intended to lead to 
sensations, while the same words used in narrative describe 
and are only intended to lead to images." (202.) 
"The 'meaning' of images is the simplest kind of 
meaning, because images resemble what they mean, whereas 
words, as a rule, do not." (Russell (1919b) 303.) In this 
sense images represent a case par exellence for corres-
pondence theory. "That of which an image is a copy is called 
its 'prototype'; and this, or its parts, ... is always an 
indispensable part of the cause either of the image, or of 
its constituents (in the case of complex imagination-im-
age)." (304.) In developing this semantic standpoint Russell 
speaks of image-proposition and word-proposition and of the 
possibility of translation from the one formulation into the 
other, and expounds the thesis that images may apply to par-
ticulars and universals as well (cr. 308f. and Russell 
(1921) 208ff.). In connection with imagination it is the as-
sociation which plays the determining role. "The essence of 
imagination ... is the absence of belief together with a 
novel combination of known elements." (Russell (1927b) 199.) 
"What causes us, in imagination, to put elements together in 
a new way? Let us think first of concrete instances. You 
read that a ship has gone down on a route by which you have 
lately travelled; very little imagination is needed to gen-
erate the thought 'I might have gone down'. What happens 
here is obvious: the route is associated both with yourself 
and with shipwreck, and you merely eliminate the middle 
term. Literary ability is largely an extension of the prac-
tice of which the above is a very humble example." (200.) 
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Another example Is a not very Impressive Shakespeare-anal-
ysis which tries to explain philologically and psychologi-
cally the associations involved in the text. "Thus excep-
tional imaginative gifts appear to depend mainly upon 
associations that are unusual and have an emotional value 
owing to the fact that there is a certain uniform emotional 
tone about them." (201.) 
We wished to give a concise summary of Russell's dif-
ferent views on image and imagination without being compell-
ed to deal extensively with his conceptions concerning mem-
ory, meaning, belief, truth and falsehood and all the other 
fields where image and imagination can appear. At the end of 
this summary we must confess that this picture is rather 
confused and this is not solely our fault: Russell's theory 
on image and imagination, this attempt to formulate a posi-
tive approach to unreal existences, consists of different 
proposals which stand ontologically and semantically in con-
tradiction to each other and which, taken individually, 
prove to be too general and cannot reveal the characteris-
tics of this phenomenon. The problem was originally conceiv-
ed of on the basis of Principia Mathematlca and we find this 
starting-point very promising in several respect: images are 
introduced here as descriptions, i. e. expressions denoting 
one object which must consequently exist. This explanation 
of images has the sense that images can be presented only as 
descriptions, everybody taking part in the communication 
cannot be acquainted with the object of the images, as it is 
habitually inaccessible for everybody outside of the speaker. 
Nevertheless the speaker has the possibility of verifying 
the existence of this object: "... if ... what is given is 
never the thing, but merely one of the 'sensibilia' which 
compose the thing, then what we apprehend in a dream is just 
as much given as what we apprehend in waking life." (Russell 
(1914) 166-167.) We do not dispose of a register of the real 
objects, objects are identified by means of sense-data. If 
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we have sense-data, we must admit that their object exists 
in the case of dreams, hallucinations, etc. these objects 
"have their position in the private space of the perspective 
of the dreamer; where they fail is in their correlation with 
other private spaces and therefore with perspective space. 
But in the only sense in which 'there' can be a datum, they 
are 'there' just as truly as any of the sense-data of waking 
life." (167.) This analysis is very instructive because it 
tries to explain a number of idiosyncratic phenomena on the 
basis of the accepted general solution. This leads, however, 
to contradictions: it is impossible to allow for the exist-
ence of all the objects which can be inferred from our dif-
ferent sense-data, if we want to keep up a coherent view of 
the world we must reject 'things' which "cannot be combined 
according to the laws of physics with the 'things' inferred 
from waking sense-data". (170.) It means that the obejcts 
are there and are not there at the same time, the coherence 
of the system is not satisfactory. There is a positive solu-
tion, as we have pointed out in the previous part, where 
Russell's negative remarks were taken into consideration: on 
the basis of socio-cultural conventions there may be differ-
entiated several uses of language which, according to the 
conventions, may have different definitions as to existence, 
in the number of thpse different existences there should be 
included fictionality as well which has primarily a conven-
tional character. However Russell cannot accept this sort 
of solution as he does not believe in the central importance 
of conventionality, he believes in a natural process of the 
development of language and inquires into rather idio-
synchratic connections of language which are not primarily 
communicative and which by their very nature can be system-
atically accounted for only with difficulty: he deals with 
private language, the language of dreams, but always in such 
a way that normality is victorious over excessive deviation 
and madness. The topics are very difficult and in spite of 
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Russell's deep insights his treatment remains fragmentary 
and unsatisfactory. Russell's fundamental methodological 
problem consists in demonstrating how one and the same thing 
can be two, i. e. how an image is just the same as a sensa-
tion and how they differ from one another. The general an-
swer used to be that image is mental and sensation is mate-
rial, however this distinction is not important in Russell's 
philosophy: mind and matter may have the same structure in 
the sense of neutral monism, therefore some other distinc-
tion is needed. An extreme solution is presented in Russell 
(1915): "If ... imagination involves no time-relation of 
subject and object, then it is a simpler relation than sensa-
tion, being ... merely acquaintance with particulars. The 
object imagined may, on this view, have any position in time 
or none, so far as the mere fact of its being imagined is 
concerned. Sensation, on the other hand, is a relation to a 
particular which involves simultaneity between subject and 
object. Sensation implies ficquaintance with the object, but 
is not identical with acquaintence." (43.) The opposition 
of imagination and sensation goes back to an early reflec-
tion: "non-existential occupation of time, if possible at 
all, is radically different from the existential kind of 
occupation." (Russell (1903) 472.) The introduction of non-
-existential occupation of time has the consequence that we 
must know the objects directly, not by means of sensations, 
and this conviction should lead us to give up Russell's 
whole conception with a sensational, interpretational lan-
guage and to introduce objects on the basis of a realistic 
ontology and to explore several insights by means of which 
the objects can be investigated. Therefore we must agree 
with Russell in rejecting this possibility. But with this 
proposal he gives up.the possibility of introducing arbi-
trary units as individuals in the language: image or imagi-
nation should not be considered as the simplest relation of 
acquaintance but as a consequence of a sensation-relation. 
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Therefore image is conceived of as secondary element, name-
ly as a copy of a sensational prototype. This means again a 
new turning point in the development of the theory: the def-
inition of image in the manner of the word 'meaning' means 
a break not only with the realistic conception, but with the 
early ideas expounded on the basis of Principia Mathematica; 
images no longer appear as descriptions considered in the 
process of presenting and acquiring knowledge, but as voca-
bulars of a subjective way of expression. Russell presents 
a theory of meaning new in several respects: he enumerates 
the different constituents that may have meaning and he con-
siders complex forms such as propositions, beliefs with 
their objectives, the interrelations of these forms with 
images, etc. The new element of this theory is that meaning 
is defined in spite of his anti-conventionalist "conviction 
by features of use, Russell applies here first of all the 
methods of behaviorism. This meaning conception is not ex-
pounded in a formal way comparable to the denotation theory" 
in Principia Mathematica, but its main lines are pointed 
out. The theory is based on the Frege-principle: "The ob-
jective reference of a proposition is a function (in the 
mathematical sense) of the meanings of its component words." 
(Russell (.1921). 371.) Propositions have, however a. different^ 
dimension which is the characteristic duality of truth and 
falsehood. This essential semantic duality is inquired into 
on different levels. Propositions such as linguistic formu-
lations are contrasted with facts. Facts maybe positive and 
negative (as to negative facts cf. Russell (1918-1919) 
211ff; and Oaklander and Miracchi (.1980)). Facts can be most 
simply translated by means of image-propositions "which may 
be believed or disbelieved, but do not allow any duality of 
content corresponding to positive and negative facts" (Rus-
sell (.1921). 276.). The word-propositions represent another 
level, they "are always positive facts, but are of two kinds: 
one veriried by a positive objective, the other by a nega-
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tive objective." (Russell (1921) 277.) Russell introduced 
facts under Wittgenstein's influence: as Quine points out, 
facts are "non-linguistic things that are akin to sentences 
and asserted by them ... His facts are what many of us would 
have been content to call true propositions" (Quine (1966) 
664.) Russell himself called them so in his early writings. 
This solution did not find Quine's approval: "Russell's pre-
dilection for a fact ontology depended, I suggested, on con-
fusion of meaning with reference. Otherwise I think Russell 
would have made short shrift of facts. He would have been 
put off by what strikes a reader of "The Philosphy of Logi-
cal Atomism": how the analysis of facts rests on analysis of 
language. Anyway Russell does not admit facts as fundamental: 
atomic facts are atomic as facts go, but they are compound 
objects. The atoms of Russell's logical atomism are not a-
tomic facts but sense data." (665-666.) We can have no bet-
ter opinion about the theory of image-propositions: there 
is no regular structure for this proposition and its con-
stituents given, the terminology worked out for lingual con-
nections which appear according to this theory on another 
level seem to be metaphorically applied to the visual sphere, 
and in this way the correlations which surely exist between 
image and word are put into an unadmittedly close contact. 
The whole process of translation hinted at several times 
cannot be discussed with such predispositions. In this way 
we have different ways of expression which are so complicat-
ed that there are no direct connections between them, this 
applies to the behavioristic relations which try to explain 
an unconventional subjective form of thinking such as imagi-
nation, hallucination, dream, etc. It must be emphasised that 
these forms are not parts of a socio-cultural communication, 
nor are they to be considered as a genre of communications, 
but they are embedded in psycho-physiological processes 
which have without doubt an important signifiance in human 
life, although its characteristics are quite different from 
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the socio-cultural connection. The relative importance of 
these elements is different from the point of view of the 
language system and its use and although it is desirable 
that all the elements should be taken into account yet they 
should be given the weight which is their due according to 
the grammar and the use of language. In this sense the sub-
jective forms chosen by Russell are not to be considered as 
fundamental linguistic relations; they are, on the contrary, 
secondary forms belonging to different minimal classes. 
Therefore we must hold this theory, in spite of the'interest-
ing and sometimes even revealing analysis, to be erroneous. 
If we take one of its most attractive features, the defini-
tion of contents of images on the basis of associations, we 
are aware of the difficulties of the theory. "... a word or 
image means an object ... when it has the same associations 
as the object. But this definition must not be interpreted 
too absolutely: a word or image will not have all the same 
association as the objects which it means." (Russell (1921) 
291.) This rather vaguely defined relation is applied on the 
one hand to explicate consciousness and, generally, the 
mind: in this connection it is postulated that several im-
ages belong to a certain prototype which may be related to 
each other without the help of the prototype. On the other 
hand the introduction of the prototype raises the question 
of whether the mental events are causally dependent upon 
physical events in a sense in which the converse dependence 
does not hold. This dependence is the materialistic view of 
the question, and Russell, who would like to maintain his 
neutral position, is compelled to declare: "... I think the 
bulk of the evidence points to the materialistic answer as 
the more probable." (303.) In this case all that he said 
about the mnemic causation as a special cause of images, 
their mental nature, etc. loses its importance; we believe 
that the dilemmas can be solved if they are put in the form 
of an empirically formulated question and we are interested 
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not in the philosophical but the empirical solution. Asso-
ciations play an important role in the modern theory of lan-
guage for instance, Saussure attemps to capture the associa-
tions but he takes a conventional system into consideration 
and he and his followers have incomparably more to say than 
the philosopher considering expressions. A detailed inves-
tigation of. Russell's proposals seems to be as devoid of 
interest in this respect as the analysis of his remarks con-
cerning literary analysis: the research in these fields 
achieved more valuable results. 
And what is the importance of this theory of imagina-
tion for fictionality? We must see that imagination can only 
account for the psychological ability of the narratives, but 
not for their conventional rules. Therefore a particular un-
certainty in evaluating fictional narrative exists': although 
a special use of the words evoking images in the narrative 
has been introduced Russell speaks of "a consistent whole 
composed partly or wholly of false propositions, as in a 
novel." (Russell (1921) 268.) In this sense the theory of 
imagination is an unsuccessful attempt to complete the 
classical denotation theory with a positive approach to un-
real existences. The cause of the failure consists in 
choosing the subjective psycho-physiological elements to 
interpret language and to postulate a unique homonymous sys-
tem for language itself. Nevertheless, with the requirement 
of conventional use of the words there appears the possi-
bility of the delimitation of a genre as a special way of 
communication. We appreciate this attempt to define these 
uses of meaning, however we would not like to put these 
special images - these rather questionable units - at the 
centre of the definitions, we are convinced that the genre 
is not determined by the direction towards one or other 
image, but by socio-cultural conventions that can be mapped 
into the language by means of different language systems in 
competition with each other. 
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3. At the end of our discussion we have to raise the ques-
tion of how far this conception, which has proved to be in 
some formal respect very important, in other connections of 
the interpretation however, erroneous can be considered as 
characteristic of the nominalistic systems of fictionality, 
i. e. of the Russellian systems. During the analysis we 
have had the chance to be convinced that Russell's system 
cannot be held to be nominalistic in every respect: he pos-
tulates universals, and the ontological basis of some of his 
terms such as negative fact and even fact etc. may be que-
ried. His way of interpreting language with respect to 
sense-data which are considered as the building stones of 
material and mental structures of the universe in the sense 
of neutral monism is not commonly widespread among the nom-
inalists of logico-linguistic semantics. At the same time 
we must be conscious of the fact that through his theory of 
description Russell exerted an influence in the interest of 
nominalism and against Meinongian conceptions and his con-
ception of the imaginary belongs to the same approach. How-
ever we do not want to give an appreciation of his role in 
the history of philosophy, and our points of view have been 
methodological ones: we pointed out the double approach to 
fictionality which has the specific appearance of denotion 
theory and the theory of imagination and which expresses the 
dilemma to give either a totally negative or a positive so-
lution to fictionality. We have evaluated Russell's denota-
tion theory which corresponds to the negative answer, how-
ever we have tried to show that Russell's formulation should 
be completed in such a way that fictionality could be dealt 
with, and only Russell's positive solution was rejected, not 
the positive solution as such. These contradictory impulses 
stem from the acknowledgement of two principles at the same 
time, the first is that objects should not be multiplied, 
consequently we need not assign existence to objects which 
have been invented; the second is that if something is there 
- 359 -
it must be acknowledged, this principle can be fully sat-
isfied in a stratified language system. The problem is that 
the severe nominalistic methodology prohibits the accepting 
of some appearances as existents which we believe to Know 
on the basis of our native language and our conventions. 
What is the way out: criticizing natural language in the 
name of science and an ideal language or in proving it to 
be considerate to the naivities of language and conven-
tions? There is no general answer. What we have tried to 
make understandable in connection with fictionality is that 
existence should not be sought only in the physical or 
psycho-physiological sphere but in socio-cultural contexts, 
in conventions and in different pragmatic factors. These 
social elements should not appear foreign to nominalism, a 
nominalist treatment of their complex structures would con-
tribute to their better and simpler understanding. The same 
applies to fictionality: we are acquainted with these (phy-
sically) non-existent figures, and we should give an account 
of the nature of our acquaintance. 
Notes 
1 This study was formulated for the "Semantics of Fiction" 
- number of Poetics, 11 (1982). editor: Prof. Dr. Hannes 
Rieser, however, it could not be published because of its 
length. It represents at the same time a part of my invfes-
tigations concerning fictionality, as to the central ideas 
of my conception cf. my study: The Main Views on Fiction-
ality in the Logico-Semantic Tradition, Stud.ia poetica 3, 
pp. 115-124. and another long study about the Meinongian 
semantics in correspondance with fictionality: Semantik ftir 
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heimatlose Gegenstände. Die Bedeutung von Meinongs Gegen-
standstheorie für die Theorie der Fiktionalität, Studia 
poética 3, pp. 3-114. The present study should not be con-
sidered as a finished work about nominalistic semantics, 
not even the whole part of the Russellian semantics could 
be dealt with, the most important failures are Russell's 
critic on Leibniz and the late development of the inter-
pretation of his logical analysis. These parts will be 
finished later on, for the time being it appears in this 
form. 
"My intellectual journeys have been, in some respects, 
disappointing. When I was young I hoped to find religious 
satisfaction in philosophy; even after I had abandoned He-
gel, the eternal Platonic world gave me something nonhuman 
to admire. I thought of mathematics with reverence, and 
suffered when Wittgenstein led me to regard it as nothing 
but tautologies. I have always ardently desired to find 
some justification outside human life and to deserve feel-
ings of awe. X am thinking in part of very obvious things, 
such as the starry heavens and a stormy sea on a rocky 
coast; in part of the vastness of the^ scientific universe, 
both in space and time, as compared to the life of man-
kind; in part of the edifice of impersonal truth, espe-
cially truth which, like that of mathematics, does not 
merely describe the world that happens to exist. Those who 
attempt to make a religion of humanism, which recognizes 
nothing greater than man, do not satisfy my emotions. And 
yet X am unable to believe that, in the world as known, 
there is anything that I can value outside human beings, 
and, to a much lesser extent, animals. Not the starry 
heavens, but their effects on human percipients, have ex-
cellence; to admire the universe for its size is slavish 
and absurd; impersonal non-human truth appears to be a 
delusion. And so my intellect goes with the humanists, 
though my emotions violently rebel." Russell (1944a) 19-20. 
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14 
in the beginning of the century, X had composed 
various stories and, later, I made up stories to while 
away the tedious climb from the beach to our house in 
Cornwall. Some of the latter have since been Written down, 
though never published. In about 1912, I had written a 
novel, in the manner of Mallock's New Republic, called 
The Perplexities of John Forstioe. Though the first half 
of it I still think is not bad, the latter half seems very 
dull to me, and I have never made any attempt to publish 
it. I also invented a story that I never published." 
Russell (1969) 34. 
4 
"... logical constants are all notions definable in terms 
of the following: Implication, the relation of a term to 
a class of which it is a member, the notion of such that, 
the notion of relation, and such further notions ..." 
(Russell (.1903/3..) 
"It may be observed that, although implication is indefi-
nable, proposition can be defined. Every proposition 
implies itself, and whatever is not a proposition implies 
nothing. Hence to say 'p is a proposition' is equivalent 
to saying 'p implies p'; and this equivalence may be used 
to define propositions." (15.) 
6 "But a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, 
does not .itself contain words: it contains the entities 
indicated by words." (47) 
7 "Predicates ... are concepts, other than verbs, which oc-
cur in propositions having only one term or subject." 
(.45.). 
8 "Every verb, in the logical sense of the word, may be 
regarded as a relation; when it occurs as verb, it actual-
ly relates, but when it occurs as verbal noun it is the 
bare relation considered independently of the terms which 
it relates." (52.) 
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"Worlds all have meaning, in the simple sense that they 
stand for something other than themselves." (47.) 
1 0 "But a proposition unless it happens to be linguistic, 
does not itself contain words: it contains the entities e» 
indicated by words." (47.) 
"Here the Gedanke is what I have called an unasserted 
proposition - or rather, what I called by this name co-
vers both the Gedanke alone and the Gedanke together 
with its truth-value. It will be will to have names for 
these two distinct notions; I shall call the the Gedanke 
alone a propositional concept; the truth-value of a Ge-
danke I shall call an assumption." (503.) The last re-
mark is completed by the following erroneous note: 
"Fege, like, Meinong, calls this an Annahme: FuB. p. 21." 
As to Annahme cf. Kanyo (1980)a. 'Assumption' was not 
used later in this sense in the Russellian system. 
12 
cf. "Matter, we are told, is a substance, a thing, a sub-
ject, of which secondary qualities are the predicates. 
But this traditional answer cannot content us. The whole 
doctrine of subject and predicate ... is radically false, 
and must be abandoned." (Russell (1903) 466.) 
13 
"Coffa (1980) demonstrates an essential differences bet-
ween the theory of knowledge by acquaintance and Rus-
sell's ideas explained in "On Denoting". 
1 4 A typical evaluation of it by Quine goes as follows; 
"Now here, in contrast to the class matter, I think Rus-
sell even concedes the Platonists too much; retention of 
the two-place predicate 'is similar to' is no evidence 
of assuming a corresponding abstract entity, the simi-
larity relation, as long as that relation is not invoked 
as a value of a bound variable. .A moral of all this is 
that in attention to referential semantics works two ways, 
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obscuring some ontological assumptions and creating an 
illusion of others." (Quine (1966) 662.) 
^ cf. "God and immortality, the central dogmas of the 
Christian religion, find no support is science. It can-
not be said that either doctrine is essential to reli-
gion, since neither is found in Buddhism... But we in 
the West have come to think of them as the irreducible 
minimum of theology. No doubt people will continue to 
entertain these beliefs, because they are pleasant, just 
as it is pleasant to think ourselves virtuous and our 
enemies wicked. But for my part I cannot see any ground 
for either. I do not pretend to be able to proye that 
there is no God. I equally cannot prove that Satan is 
a fiction. The Christian God may exist; so may the Gods 
of Olympus, or of ancient Egypt, or of Babylon. But no 
one of these hypotheses is more probable than any other; 
they lie outside the region, of even probable knowledge, 
and therefore there is no reason to consider any of them." 
(Russell (1925). 13-14.). 
1 6 cf. "... the basis of a language is not conventional, 
either from the point of view of the individual or from 
that of the comunity. A child learning to speak is learn-
ing habits and associations which are just as much deter-
mined hy the environment as the habit of expecting dogs 
to bark and cocks to crow. ... a conventional origin is 
clearly just as mythical as the social contract by which 
Hobbes and Rousseau supposed civil government to have 
been established. We can hardly suppose a parliament of 
hitherto speechless elders meeting together and agreeing 
to call a cow a cow and a wolf a wolf. The association 
of words with their meanings must have grown, up by 
some natural process, though at present the nature of the 
process in unknown." (Russell (1921) 189-190.). 
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Russell's arguments against conventionalism have been 
definitely refuted in Lewis (1969) . 
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